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I. Introduction
This is the Court of Chancery; which has its decaying houses and its
blighted lands in every shire; which has its worn-out lunatic in every
madhouse, and its dead in every churchyard; which has it ruined
suitor, with his slipshod heels and threadbare dress, borrowing and
begging through the round of every man's acquaintance; which
gives to monied might the means abundantly of wearing out the
right; which so exhausts finances, patience, courage, hope; so
overthrows the brain and breaks the heart; that there is not an
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honourable man amoung its practitioners who would not give - who
does not often give - the warning, "Suffer any wrong that can be
done you, rather than come here!"
Charles Dickens, Bleak House, 1852
Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike
is an age-old problem. People have never ceased to hope andstrive
to move closer to that goal. Hugo Black, Griffin v. II., 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
We have not progressed especially far since the time Dickens
decried the bleak house of justice. Despite the promise of equal
justice for all emblazoned at the entrance of the Supreme Court,
"monied might" still has the means of "wearing out the right" and
those who need the courts protection are still wisely counseled:
"Suffer any wrong that can be done you, rather than come here!"
The advent of new communications technologies and the
transformations they have brought to a myriad of social institutions
begs the question - can new technology bring us closer to solving the
"age-old problem" of equal justice? Will the problems of equal
justice be exacerbated by unequal access to technology? If the digital
divide is solved, if poor people are given access to computers and the
telecommunications services to connect them, will that solve the
problem of equal access to justice?
There should be little question but that communications
technology can be a boon to civil society. Educators and scientists
have found ways to make cyberspace extend the reach of both human
wisdom and exploration, making available our finest libraries and
museums, as well as up-to-the-second activities of NASA and the
human genome project. However, as government, civil and religious
forces have waned, the dominant and perhaps determinant forces
behind how we use this technology and how it develops are global
corporations. It should not be surprising that commercial market
forces have solved a number of "consumer" problems that never
before really seemed like problems. To wit: in the process of
exploring the commercial possibilities of a communications system
designed to send information even in the event of a military attack,
American genius has found a way for us to purchase movie tickets
without having to speak to a human being. The same force behind
this seemingly innocuous convenience has also made the grossest
excesses of pornography available to our children. There is little
remarkable in the observation that new technologies offer both
solutions and problems. Note, however, that these particular
[24:505
solutions and problems were not created by technology per se but by
commercial market forces, little hindered by other social forces.
There has been much work looking at the problems and solutions
of new communications technologies concerning business and
government, and far too little focus on what light-speed networked
communications means for social programs. Despite all the talk
about the digital divide, considerations of the real communications
needs (both access to information and voice) of most Americans are
warped by the twin paradigms which dominate current discourse:
technology as road to paradise and laissez-faire economic (presently
disguised as "market economics") theory as the road map. If it is true
that the commercial market determines the current direction of
technology, it is only because business leaders (today's monied might)
have an excessive amount of power over our democratic
representatives who make policy.
The problem of the diminished access poor people have to
communications technology is not really a problem about access to
entertainment, computer video games or DVD players. The problem
is tied up in the notion that what is "digital" (communications
technology) will become an integral part of our lives as students,
workers and citizens. This article challenges the current market-
centered technology-happy discourse by exploring some of the
dangers and limits of new communications technology as a corrective
to a problem that has long divided rich and poor, a problem that
defines the degree to which we can truly call ourselves a civilization,
the problem of unequal access to justice in a civil society. It will also
explore the real and important opportunities made possible by these
new technologies. However, the first section will spend some time
describing the problem of equal access to justice we would like new
digital communications technologies to solve.
II. The Problem: Providing Needed Legal Services to Most
Americans
Under these conditions the defense is naturally placed in a very
unfavorable and difficult position. But that too is intentional. For
the defense is not actually countenanced by the Law, but only
tolerated, and there is even some controversy as to whether the
relevant passages of the Law can truly be construed to include even
such tolerance.
-Franz Kafka, The Trial, 1925
20021 DIGITAL DIVIDE AND EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE
HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.
The poor man looks upon the law as an enemy, not as a friend. For
him the law is always taking something away.
-Robert Kennedy1
A. Millions of "Disconnected" Americans
As we begin an examination into equal access to justice, let us
consider the courts as lawyers, and separate, at least for the moment,
civil and criminal courts.
Regarding civil legal needs, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor told
the American Bar Association in 1991:
Every day, all over the country people lose their homes or
apartments when the law says they should keep them, and people
can't feed their children when the law says they should be able to
feed them. People don't know the rights they have; even if they
know the rights they have, they don't know how to enforce them.
And it all has one cause - many people desperately need legal
services but can't afford to pay.
In 1993 the American Bar Association conducted a national
survey to "learn about the legal needs of Americans, what they do
about those needs and how satisfied they are with the outcomes." A
few years later, in its "Final Report on the Implications of the
Comprehensive Legal Needs Study," the ABA concluded that "our
civil justice system is fundamentally disconnected from the lives of
millions of Americans.,3
The ABA placed special emphasis on the situations facing both
poor and moderate-income households. They defined the poor as
those with household incomes below $25,000. Moderate income
households were defined as those between $25,000 and $65,000.
According to the latest census reports there are over 65 million
American households, two-thirds of the population, making $65,000
or less each year.4 The ABA found that each year about half of poor
and moderate-income households face a serious legal situation, but
only about one-third of this half bring their problem to either an
1. Quoted by Patricia Wald, Law and Poverty at 6 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1965) (referencing Attorney General Robert Kennedy's
Law Day Speech May 1, 1964).
2. Assoc. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Pro Bono Work-Good News and Bad
News, (Remarks at the American Bar Association Meeting, Aug. 12, 1991).
3. Albert H. Cantril, Agenda for Access: The American People and Civil Justice
(American Bar Association, May 1996).
4. U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty 1999 <http://www.census.govihhes/
www/povty99.html> (Aug. 22, 2002).
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attorney or to court. Therefore, roughly 20 million Americans with
real legal needs doubt that they will be helped by lawyers and the
courts, and they doubt that they can afford the cost. While many
have reason to doubt, others simply do not understand that they have
rights which a lawyer or the court might help protect.
B. Federal Support for the Poor in Civil Cases
It is arguable that the poor have more legal resources available
to them than those with moderate incomes. Beginning with the
Johnson Administration's support of the Office of Legal Services in
1965, and continuing to the present with the Legal Services
Corporation, federal funding has supported access to civil courts by
the poor.
Legal services can be credited with advancing substantial legal
rights for the poor. Landmark court decisions are directly
attributable to the work of the LSC: Shapiro v. Thompson,5 which
ensures that public assistance recipients will not arbitrarily be denied
benefits; Goldberg v. Kelly,6 which requires the government will
follow due process when seeking to end benefits; and Fuentes v.
Shevin,7 which ensures that financial institutions and other private
parties must follow due process when seeking to repossess property.
LSC estimates that about 2400 offices in the country are
supported by the Legal Services Corporation. Today, limited legal
assistance is provided to persons with an income equivalent to 125%
of the federal poverty level or below. In the contiguous 48 states, a
family of four with a household income of $22,063 qualifies.8
If you are unfortunate enough to benefit from LSC funds, there
remain a few well-placed hurdles that will determine whether your
particular circumstance can be addressed. Congress has placed many
restrictions on the recipients (lawyers or community groups) of LSC
funds. For example, LSC will not provide funds to recipients "that
defend persons in public housing eviction proceedings, who have
been charged with certain illegal drug activities, regardless of the
source of the funds used to pay for the representation." 9 Nor can
LSC recipients initiate or participate in any civil class action. I°
5. 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
6. 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
7. 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
8. Legal Services Corp., LSC Releases 2002 Strategic Progress Report
<http://www.lsc.gov/index2.htm> (accessed Feb. 11, 2002).
9. 45 C.F.R.. pt. 1613.
10. 45 C.F.R. pt. 1617.
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According to Alan W. Houseman, Director of the Center for
Law and Social Policy, congressional cuts in appropriations and
restrictions on the work of legal services are the result of a
"substantial and unrelenting attack" by a well-organized. and "well-
financed cadre of right wing activists."" In the absence of
countervailing organization and funding, Houseman is left to declare
that the "era of legal services is over."' 2
C. Pro Bono Services
Beyond services provided by LSC, lawyers in private practice
offer free or reduced fee services (pro bono services) to, the poor.
With few exceptions the private bar has adopted rule 6.1 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. That rule encourages public
interest legal service "at no fee, or a reduced fee to persons of limited
means.. .,," However, as the Illinois bar argues, "an appropriate
disciplinary standard regarding pro bono and public service is
difficult, if not impossible to articulate. That ABA Model Rule 6.1
itself uses the word "should" instead of "shall" in describing this duty
reflects the uncertainty of the ABA on this issue."14
In addition to encouraging pro bono service in their model rules,
in 1993 the ABA challenged the nation's five hundred biggest law
firms to contribute 3 to 5 percent of their billable hours. Many of the
largest firms declined; by 1995, only 171 of the 500 largest firms had
agreed. 5
The American Bar Association bills itself as "the largest
voluntary professional membership association in the world." It has
more than 400,000 members. However, despite a continuing effort to
encourage pro bono activity, including the current ABA President's
focus on pro bono work, the ABA estimates that only 130,000 lawyers
take some pro bono or reduced-fee cases. 6
Quoting again from the ABA's Agenda for Access: "Even with
their combined efforts, the private bar and publicly-funded legal
11. Alan Houseman, Can Legal Services Achieve Equal Justice?
<http://www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/1037134525.86/dialogue.htm> (Dec. 1997).
12. Id.
13. Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and
Standards at 183 (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1991).
14. Id. at 185.
15. Ralph Nader & Wesley J. Smith, No Contest, Corporate Lawyers and the
Perversion of Justice in America at 341 (Random House, New York, 1996).
16. ABA, Agenda for Access: The American People and Civil Justice,
<http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/newres.htm> (1996).
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services programs now serve only a small portion of legal needs
reported by low-income households."17 The problem is clear enough.
Most Americans simply do not 'have adequate access to our judicial
system, and neither government supported legal services nor private
pro bono efforts are sufficient.
D. The Inadequacy of Constitutional Protections
What most Americans might consider to be a constitutional right
of access to justice is very limited in the view of the Supreme Court,
particularly regarding civil proceedings. However, the ideal of equal
access to justice has some real, though fading, resonance in criminal
proceedings. I begin here with a brief tour of the most pertinent
provisions established in the Constitution.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[in] all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.' '18 The Warren Court generally
interpreted this to mean that upon request the state shall provide a
defendant with an attorney at the early stages of his interactions with
police and the courts through to his probable conviction, sentencing,
and first appeal.
The Fifth Amendment reads, "No person shall ... be compelled
in a criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'9 Police and
courtroom television dramas filled with phrases such as "taking the
Fifth" and "Miranda warnings" have made this part of the Bill of
Rights well-known by most Americans. Thanks to the seemingly
endless variety of police dramas (Kojac, NYPD Blue, etc.), a person
unfortunate enough to be arrested knows he has a right to remain
silent, the right to be told that any statement he makes may be used
against him, and the right to an attorney provided by the State if he
cannot afford one.
In addition to applying the Bill of Rights to the states, the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "no State shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."'2 It is this part of the Bill of Rights that might more
broadly be perceived to protect access to justice, even beyond
17. Id.
18. U.S. Const. art. VI
19. U.S. Const. art. V
20. U.S. Const. art. XIV
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criminal proceedings. But the courts have not generally interpreted
either "due process" or "equal protection" to mean free-access to the
courts or state-provided legal representation before a judge or jury.
For example, the Court has limited access to civil courts to divorce
proceedings.
In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held Connecticut's
requirement of a $60 fee to sue for divorce unconstitutional. Justice
Harlan wrote for the majority that "given the basic position of the
marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the
concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving
this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying,
solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals
who seek a dissolution of their marriages."21 Justice Brennan sought
to expand this ruling beyond divorce proceedings,22 but there was not
a majority for that assertion.
In United States v. Kras, the Court upheld a provision of the
Bankruptcy Act requiring individuals seeking bankruptcy protection
to pay costs and fees of about $50. Kras, an indigent man in sole care
of several children, including one who was gravely ill, was denied his
application to file for bankruptcy despite his inability to pay the
required court costs. Justice Stewart wrote in dissent:
[The] bankrupt is bankrupt precisely for the reason that the state
stands ready to exact all of his debts through [the] panoply of
[creditor] remedies. [In] the unique situation of the indigent
bankrupt, the Government provides the only effective means of
his ever being free of these Government-imposed obligations.
[Unless] the Government provides him access to the bankruptcy
court, Kras will remain in the totally hopeless situation he now
finds himself. [The] Court today holds that Congress may say
that some of the poor are too poor to even go bankrupt."
21. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
22. Id. at 387-88. "A State has an ultimate monopoly of all judicial process and
attendant enforcement machinery. [The] right to be heard [extends] to all proceedings
entertained by the courts."
23. 409 U.S. 434 (1973). Justice Marshall joined Stewart's dissent, but took particular
exception to the majority's cavalier assumption that Kras could have saved to pay the
filing fee. "It may be easy for some people to think that weekly savings of less than $2 are
no burden. But no one who has had close contact with the poor can fail to understand
how close to the margin of survival many of them are. A sudden illness, for example, may
destroy whatever savings they may have accumulated, and by eliminating a sense of
security may destroy the incentive to save in the future."
[24:505
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Despite how the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Constitution, there remains deeply rooted in most Americans a sense
of what the Constitution stands for: that regardless of a person's
talents and abilities, regardless of her wealth or father's status, all
who are brought before the court will have a roughly equal
opportunity to have their case fairly presented and considered before
judge or jury. Mark Tushnet calls this "sense" the "thin Constitution"
or populist constitutional law, the relatively small and cohesive set of
general principles as understood and embraced by the people rather
than the "thick" body of case law and doctrine promulgated by courts
and the lawyers. In "Taking the Constitution Away From The
Courts," Tushnet challenges the tradition of judicial review, arguing
that the attachment to respect for the Court's final opinion
interpreting the Constitution is due in part to a reverence some
liberals have for the anomalous Court led by Chief Justice Earl
Warren.24
"Gideon's Trumpet," 25 by journalist Anthony Lewis, is a perfect
example of this reverence. Lewis' story suggests the power of
populist constitutional law when he notes the labor of an indigent
drifter, Clarence Gideon, to prove his assertion before a Florida state
court that "[the] United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to
be represented by Counsel., 26  Gideon was wrong about what the
Court said, but he was right about what at least the Warren Court
would say. His populist understanding of the Constitution was
unwavering.
The constitutional right to counsel in criminal proceedings has
progressed substantially as a result of Gideon's efforts and the
Warren Court. A 2000 study released by the Justice Department
reveals that 66 percent of federal felony defendants in 1998, and 82
percent of felony defendants in the 75 most populous counties in
1996, were represented by publicly-financed attorneys. In another
study, it was reported that an estimated $1.2 billion was spent to
provide legal services to criminal defendants in the nation's 100 most
populous counties.'
24. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts at 129-35
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999).
25. Anthony Lewis, Gideon's Trumpet (Vintage Books, New York, 1989).
26. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
27. Caroline Wolf Harlow, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics (Nov. 29, 2000).
28. Carol J. DeFrances and Marika F.X. Litras, Indigent Defense Service in Large
Counties, 1999, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Nov. 29, 2000). "Ninety
percent of the federal defendants and 75 percent of the defendants in the most populous
20021
Despite the increased public support for criminal defense, Kate
Jones of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL) writes:
[What] we actually have in almost every state and county across
America is token adherence to the right to counsel without concern
for the way this right is actually exercised. In many state justice
systems (to use a pass from the Supreme Court's recent decision
[Bush v. Gore]) "the problem inheres in the absence of specific
standards to ensure its equal application." ... Countless dedicated
public defenders and appointed counsel across the land labor under
staggering caseloads and abysmal funding that may not even cover
their costs on a case, let alone provide for a reasonable fee. State
and local governments increasingly impose new criminal statutes
and increase penalties without corresponding increases in resources
for an adequate defense.29
The Rehnquist Supreme Court is not the Warren Court which
welcomed Gideon's petition in 1963. Tushnet argues that the Court
has simply reverted to its more characteristic "conservative" nature
''more or less in line with what the dominant national-political
coalition wants., 30  In the majority opinion of Strickland v.
Washington, Justice O'Connor undertook a lengthy review of various
standards used to determine whether counsel provided to indigent
defendants was effective. The Court ruled that the defendant bears
the burden of demonstrating that his attorney failed "a standard of
reasonableness" and that the purported error was sufficient to
determine the outcome of the trial.3' The Court reversed an appellate
court ruling that defendant Strickland was denied effective counsel in
a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case.
In dissent, Marshall wrote:
It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that a person of means, by
selecting a lawyer and paying him enough to ensure he prepares
thoroughly, usually can obtain better representation than that
available to an indigent defendant, who must rely on appointed
counsel, who, in turn, has limited time and resources to devote to a
given case. Is a "reasonably competent attorney" a reasonably
competent adequately paid retained lawyer or a reasonably
counties were found guilty, regardless of representation by publicly-financed or private
counsel. However those represented by public counsel were incarcerated at a higher
rate."
29. Kate Jones, How About Equal Protection for the Poor? Washington Post, A33
(Dec. 29, 2000).
30. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts at 134-135
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999).
31. 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
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competent appointed attorney?
32
As a result of Strickland, David Cole writes, "the Court has
destroyed any real meaning of the right to counsel by allowing
virtually any attorney * even one who slept through the trial or was
drunk throughout the trial * to meet the standard of 'effective
assistance of counsel.' 3  Moreover, the Court has eroded the right to
counsel where defendants may need it most, before indictment but
after police investigation. Nor is counsel guaranteed during appeal.
"Today," Cole writes, "after thirty-six years, Gideon's horn sounds
only a distant, and increasingly hollow, echo. 34
E. Let the Market Decide?
Judge Richard Posner, renowned as a libertarian leader in what
he grandly calls the "Law and Economics Movement," would argue
that any attachment to a populist constitution is idealistic and
unhelpful in understanding how law is either created or applied.
"The 'thin' Constitution," Posner writes, "the Constitution that the
judges do not enforce, might be a more effective vehicle for instilling
a civil religion.""
Posner's religion is constructed of economic formulas to arrive at
what he deems to be sensible solutions to the contests real people
bring to the courts. However, Posner's brand of economic formula-
making puts him into the trap of the neo-classical school of
economists. These economists begin and end with the assumption of
fully and unwaveringly rational behavior on the part of economic
actors, and that whatever deviations occur from what is rational will
be subject to appropriate market corrections. By ignoring historical
context (historical context being one of the few strengths of
traditional legal analysis), such as racism, sexism, and the distorting
impact of poverty, Posner's seemingly emotionless equations begin to
veer toward the absurd.36 Other economists, most especially Amartya
32. Id. at 708.
33. David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice
System, (The New Press, New York, 1999), at 78.
34. Id. at 71-76.
35. Richard A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory, at 21 (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 2001).
36. Id. at 79. One example: in considering the costs and benefits of the display of
pornography in the workplace, Posner argues that the benefits allowing maximum
freedom of speech outweigh the offensiveness costs. The women "are compensated for
having to put up with it, in the practical economic sense that wages reflect the amenities or
disamenities of a job as well as the worker's productivity." Should we suppose that the
2002]
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Sen in the tradition of Adam Smith, not only employ equations, but
they also take a hard look at the way the market and the market
players actually operate. We will do the same; looking not at the high
ground of the Supreme Court, the Constitution, and legal theories,
but at those small places where most Americans meet the law.
Law remains suspect if only a few can afford its protection, thus
equal access to justice would seem to be a fundamental right enjoyed
by anyone accused of a crime or anyone upon whom the state would
enforce a penalty resulting from some non-criminal act.
Unfortunately, our system of justice is similar more to a bazaar, with
victory just another good to be bargained for, than to an arena where
truth and falsehood do battle.
It is no surprise that when most Americans look at the costs of
the law, they do all they can to avoid lawyers and the courts. An
inexpensive, uncontested divorce with legal assistance will cost a
minimum of $500. A contested divorce can mean thousands of
dollars and financial ruin for many Americans. Fighting a well-heeled
landlord is a financial impossibility for moderate income tenants,
when lawyers' fees often begin at $100 an hour. In these so-called
"private" disputes (where the state will ultimately take one party's
side over the other, forcing one to give up custody of their child or to
pay alimony, forcing the other from their home), the party with the
most money to spend is heavily favored to win.
Most legal troubles faced by Americans revolve around
consumer complaints and debt. In these situations the civil courts
operate as a way to process judgments against the poor. Most small
civil actions result in default judgments.37 While there is undoubtedly
a realistic assumption that the poor simply failed to pay the debt,
many of these judgments result from a failure to understand a
summons, or a failure of the process server to deliver the summons in
a poor and, no doubt, dangerous neighborhood. There may also be
the problem of taking time off work, without pay, to appear at court
for a day on the chance that the case will be called. As James
Eisenstein writes:
Even institutions and procedures designed specifically for the
poor are not used by them. For instance, they do not utilize
small claims courts. Established with the intent of providing the
women are paid more than the men?
37. ABA, Agenda for Access: The American People and Civil Justice,
<http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/newres.htm> (1996).
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indigent with a forum in which small claims could be brought
without attorneys, intricate rules, or large fees, these courts in
practice provide a convenient and inexpensive way for creditors
(collection agencies, businesses, and government) to collect small
debts from the poor.
In the late 1970's Charles Silberman reported that, even in the
area of criminal justice, the "economics of private practice tend to
militate against real concern for any but affluent clients. Few run-of-
the-mill offenders can afford to pay large fees, and the fees paid
court-appointed attorneys usually are modest."39  The statistics
demonstrating that private defense attorneys are on balance about as
successful as public defenders are .little comfort when one takes into
account that most lawyers in private practice try to offset low fees
courts provide through large volume. Successful 'wholesalers,' as
they are called, may handle five to ten cases a day, for fees ranging
anywhere from $50 per case to $200, $300, or even $500 per case. The
only way to handle that kind of volume is to plead everyone guilty; as
one private defense lawyer puts it,, "A guilty plea is a quick buck."'
A recent series in the New York Times confirms this sad state of
affairs in 2001.41
Economists might argue that the trend toward private dispute
resolution is a perfect example of how the market meets social
demand. The legal economist might argue litigants are exiting the
system of justice and choosing an alternative. This is a direct market
response to the problem, the ultimate outcome of which will be either
a correction of the defects of the judicial product or the creation of an
alternative choice.
The reality of private dispute resolution is that only the wealthy
can afford to choose it, usually to achieve quick (not just) results.
Moreover, it is often imposed upon those who have both little real
contract (i.e. economic) power to refuse it and no more ability to
advance their own interest through investigation and effective
38. James Eisenstein, Politics and the Legal Process at 331 (Harper & Row, New
York, 1973).
39. Charles E. Silberman, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice at 303 (Random
House, New York, 1978).
40. Id. at 303.
41. Jane Fritsch and David Rohde, Legal Help Often Fails New York's Poor, N.Y.
Times (April 8, 2001) (This was the first in a three part report published in subsequent
days under the titles, For New York City's Poor, a Lawyer with 1,600 Clients, and On
Appeals, the Poor Find Little Leverage.).
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argument before a private judge than in a courtroom. The economist
should look with a wary eye upon anyone who would seek to stain her
profession with the ancient problem of justice. The unequal
treatment of people at our courts is not a result of market failure and
it cannot be corrected by market action.
Any realistic assessment of the administration of justice in
America can identify the U.S. capitalist market, particularly its
excesses, at work. Any realistic assessment of the operation of the
U.S. market understands that it is not "free," in the sense that it
operates within the constraints of U.S. law. While the law acts,
weakly I would argue, as a countervailing force, in John Kenneth
Galbraith's terms, providing limited protections for labor and
consumers from corporate market power and excesses, one can
clearly see the impact of what Madison would call the mercantile
faction on our political choices and thus on our system of justice.
Still, the direction that corporate power would take our
government is in some active tension with fundamental constitutional
protections created for real people. The State of Washington and
other jurisdictions strive to implement policies which reach not
toward marketplace realities but toward Justice Marshall's
enlightened society. There are jurisdictions with legislators and
lawyers who try to establish what the millions of Gideons have in
mind when they consider their constitutional rights. In these
jurisdictions, members of the public are given greater access to court
information and proper counsel to assist them.42 Regarding capital
criminal justice matters at least, most states public defenders and
court appointed counsel are compensated largely at par with public
prosecutors, and usually have access to a staff of investigators and
social workers to assist them, as well as time to research cases and
properly consult with defendants.43
The efforts of enlightened jurisdictions, the stated concerns of
Congress in establishing the Legal Services Act, and even the pro
bono "requirements" advanced by the ABA, are borne not of an
42. Robert L. Spangenberg and Marea L. Beeman, Improving State and Local
Criminal Justice Systems, A Report on How Public Defenders, Prosecutors, and Other
Criminal Justice System Practitioners are Collaborating Across the Country, U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance
Monograph (October 1998).
43. The Spangenberg Group regularly monitors compensation and resources for
indigent defense. In their 1999 update on rates of compensation for Court-Appointed
Counsel in Capital Cases at Trial, Kentucky, Maryland, and Mississippi were the only
states with per case maximums which were not also routinely waived. See also Silberman
at 306-7.
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acceptance of the American system of justice as a market, but are
part of a steady march toward an American system of justice lit by the
idea that "all men are created equal." How will this march toward
greater access to justice be helped or hindered by new
communications technologies?
III. Considerations of Technology and Equal Access
This country has witnessed a dramatic increase of new lawyers and
computers in the last decade - unfortunately for most of us, the
lawyers did not get twice as intelligent, twice as fast, and half as
expensive every two years!
-Author unknown.
44
Our inventions are wont to be pretty toys, which distract our
attention from serious things. They are but improved means to an
unimproved end, an end which it was already but too easy to arrive
at; as railroads lead to Boston or New York. We are in great haste
to construct a magnetic telegraph from Maine to Texas; but Maine
and Texas, it may be, have nothing important to communicate.
-Henry David Thoreau, Walden, or, Life in the Woods, 1854
A. The Faustian Bargain of the Third Wave
Alvin Toffler, along with George Gilder and Esther Dyson,
views the approach of new communications technology as the
inevitable advent of a new order, a "third wave" resulting in the
obsolescence of "all our congresses, parliaments... our courts and
our regulatory agencies - in short, all the tools we use to make and
enforce collective decision. ' '4' What will this mean to the goal of
equal justice for all? Neil Postman argues that "anyone who has
studied the history of technology knows that technological change is
always a Faustian bargain: Technology giveth and technology taketh
away, and not always in equal measure. A new technology sometimes
creates more than it destroys. Sometimes, it destroys more than it
creates. ,
4 6
What do we do to adapt new technology to our purposes? We
face certain decisions regarding networked communications that are
of special importance to a discussion about access to justice. What
44. Author, Lawyer Jokes: A Collection. <http://falcon.cc.ukans.edu/
-dadams/lawyers.htm> (last accessed May 19, 2003).
45. Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave 392 (Bantam Books, New York, 1981).
46. Neil Postman, Informing Ourselves to Death, speech before the German
Infomatics Society <http://www.eff.org/pub/
Netculture ... informing-ourselvesto death.paper> (Oct. 11, 1990); see also Neil
Postman, Technopoly, The Surrender of Culture to Technology 3 - 20 (Vintage Books, New
York, 1993).
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information can be collected about the legal problem (physical
evidence, emotional distress, data)? Can that information remain
private (between the lawyer and the client, or the court and the
citizen)? Can the information (legal advice and personal
information) be authenticated?
As Lawrence Lessig notes, the limits and capabilities of
computer technologies are not functions of natural law, "[it] is as it is
designed."47 Thus, the answers to the above questions depend upon
the choices we make, and failure to choose is simply another choice.
While I do not quibble with the core of Lessig's point, it is important
to recognize that "natural law" is, in a sense, built into the design. To
the extent that computer technologies are limited or at least effected
by the tendencies of their creators, flawed human beings, the
computers replicate, in ways that are often not discovered until very
late, human flaws. In addition to unforseen errors, computer design
reflects subtle and often unacknowledged value or moral choices. As
we have seen with standardized exams, bias is built in.48 It is
transferred into the code, as DNA is transferred from parent to
offspring. Thus, while we can make intelligent choices regarding
design architecture, there is perhaps little choice about the inevitable
bias or flaw that may hide in the design. The impact of that bias or
flaw, particularly whether it limits either access or justice for people
of color or women or poor people, is more important in matters
related to the operation of our courts than to the operation of a
computer game.
What follows is a brief discussion of technological limits in legal
applications.
Information collection. Simple forms can be created to collect
some pertinent information about a client's needs. More
sophisticated computer programs can lead clients through a maze of
potential questions depending on the client's answers, utilizing voice-
recognition or touch screen technologies, in addition to standard
keyboard interactions. These computer programs can help create pro
se petitions, simple briefs, and affidavits without support from
counsel. It is also possible to record not only voice but video of the
client as she provides information for counsel to check later. With
polygraph machines and other devices to which a client might connect
himself, it is possible to collect stress measurements and even take
47. Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 216 (Basic Books, New
York, 1999).
48. See generally Peter Sacks, Standardized Minds: The High Price of America's
Testing Culture and What We Can Do to Change It (Perseus Books, Cambridge, 2000).
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and analyze skin and body fluid samples.
49Obtaining accurate information from human beings is not easy.
The myriad challenges a lawyer faces in understanding the legal needs
of a client are compounded when that client is from a different
culture (even within the same society), speaks a different language,
holds fast to different customs, or has physical (including mental)
limitations. When you replace a potentially sympathetic human with
a machine, the problems are compounded still. Not all human beings
are equally capable of, or comfortable, interacting with machines.
There is a large body of literature regarding human interaction with
computers and, while it is not within the scope of this paper to review
that literature, it can be said that there remains a tremendous amount
of work to do to simply capture the range of human expression into
digital information by computers. A brief supported by information
collected from a machine is simply not comparable to a brief filed by
the opposing party, private or state, supported by information
collected from a human. While we, along with Isaac Asimov, can
conceive of this possibility, it is not possible now.
Privacy. A fundamental premise in the communications between
lawyers, the courts, and individuals is that certain information
exchanged will remain private. Even non-lawyers understand and
assume that the information shared with their attorney will remain
confidential, and that a judge may view records or potential evidence
in chambers away from public view. This information may be as
serious as unproven allegations of criminal behavior, past criminal
behavior, by a juvenile for example, which has been sealed; or it may
be as common as medical records, or a simple home address, a
telephone number, or a social security number. To the extent that the
information exchanged is conducted by or through machines, lawyers
must worry whether third-party access breaks the seal of
confidentiality, depriving the client of effective counsel.
Encryption technologies exist which create, in essence, a private
language between the speaker and the listener. Much of electronic
commerce depends upon encryption to protect credit card numbers
and other sensitive information, providing a seemingly safe
environment for financial transactions. However, neither
government regulation nor market forces have established a means to
keep private communications private. 5° At worst, promises of privacy
49. There is a very good essay by Adam Smith, Why is usability so hard?, on the
Human- Computer Interaction Network <http://www.hcirn.com/reflect/whyhard.html>. In
addition there are thousands of academic articles on the difficulties still faced in this field.
50. See H.R. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the
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are a comforting fraud allowing relatively easy access to information
we citizens deem private. At great cost, the government uses very
sophisticated technologies to protect its own secrets and it changes
those technologies regularly to stay ahead, maybe just one step, of the
hackers. 1
The Legal Technology Institute reports that there are no
nationwide standards for protecting private information from the
public. 5 2 Organizations such as credit reporting companies regularly
conduct data sweeps of court records looking for financial
information from divorce documents, adverse judgements, and liens,
to provide information they have found, correct or not, as a
commercial product to others. Much of this "data mining" is
conducted without knowledge of the individual who provides
information to the court, expecting perhaps that it will be secure from
public view."
Concerns about surveillance of computer systems in the courts
erupted in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
based in San Francisco. On March 5, 2001, the Administrative Office
of the Courts in Washington, D.C. ordered the monitoring of all
federal court workers, and installed software to monitor Internet use.
The court responded by ordering its technology staff to disconnect
the software, causing a shutdown that affected a third of the country
and about 10,000 court employees. The Administrative Office, in
turn, complained that the shutdown might have caused security
breaches, allowing outsiders into the courts' network 4
Whether the intruder is the government or a private person,
communication through machines is not presently secure, and can be
made secure only through expensive technologies and constant
expensive vigilance.
Authentication. Bar associations exist in part to protect both the
Comm. on Energy, Testimony Mark W. Doll National Director, Security & Technology
Solutions, Ernst & Young <http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/
hearings/ll15200lHearing420/Dol1725.htm> (November 15, 2001).
51. See generally Bureau of Justice Statistics and SEARCH, Report on the National
Task Force on Privacy, Technology and Criminal Justice Information,
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rntfptcj.pdf>
52. Andrew Z. Adkins, III, Electronic Public Access to Court Records, Legal
Technology Institute, U. Fla. (Fall 1999).
53. Bureau of J. Statistics, Report on the National Task Force on Privacy,
Technology, and Criminal Justice <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov.bjs.pub/pdf/rntfptcj.pdf>
(acessed January 22, 2002).
54. Neil A. Lewis, Rebels in Black Robes Recoil at Surveillance of Computers, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 8, 2001).
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public and the profession from unqualified individuals practicing
law.5 Lawyers admitted to practice in Illinois will not necessarily be
allowed to represent clients before the courts in California. Lawyers,
even members of the relevant bar, who fail to represent their client in
a knowledgeable fashion may be disbarred. 6 Putting aside the
financial incentives to restrict the supply of legal advice, when a
woman goes to a lawyer to draft a will leaving her few possessions to
her preferred heirs, or a man wrongly accused of some brutal act
seeks an advocate, they are putting something important to them at
stake. What assurance do they have that the counselor is informed
enough to provide reliable advice?
Much has been written about the impact on journalism resulting
from the spread of false information in cyberspace. The availability
of quack remedies and medical advice over the Internet is also a
problem. Less frequently reported are the incidents of legal services
rendered by non-lawyers. The relative anonymity of cyberspace
operates as a sort of wild west for con men; even con men who mean
no harm. The New York Times provides an illustration of the
problem.
A 15-year-old using the AOL name Marcus Arnold became the
number one ranked legal expert on the website AskMe.com,
dispensing legal advice to hundreds of people each day. Much of his
information gleaned from television shows. 7 We trust the story is
true because we trust the New York Times.
Even when we rely upon a trusted Internet source for
information, are we certain the information has not been altered in
some small but legally important manner? The rules of cyberspace
are not the rules of real space. Anonymity breeds anarchy, and some
of that may be good, but that provides little comfort to people in real
need of legal services.
B. The Digital Divide
Let us make the giant leap and assume that the difficulties of
information collection, privacy and authentication mentioned above
can be resolved with the proper software. We are left with the
problem of unequal access to the Internet, sometimes called the
"digital divide." Much of the credit for the term "digital divide"
55. State v. Buyers Service Co., 292 U.S.. 426 (1987).
56. ABA Model R. Prof. Conduct 1.1 (2002).
57. Michael Lewis, Faking It: The Internet Revolution Has Nothing to Do With
Nasdaq, N.Y. Times (July 15, 2001).
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should be given to Larry Irving, the former Assistant Secretary for
Communications and Information and administrator of the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) at the
U.S. Department of Commerce. The authoritative examination of
Internet, broadband, and computer connectivity is a series of NTIA
reports called "Falling Through the Net."58 In its simplest form these
reports demonstrate, according to former Commerce Secretary
William Daley, that while "Americans are more connected to digital
tools than ever before, the report provides evidence that the 'digital
divide' between certain demographic groups and regions of our
country continues to persist and in many cases is widening
significantly."59 Just what are these "digital tools?"
In our discussion the terms "digital tools" or new technologies
refer mainly to the transmission of digital codes via networks, known
as the Internet or cyberspace. While this electronic communication
may be carried by satellite, wireless terrestrial (broadcast or
narrowcast) signals, cable, or telephone lines, most people access it
through the telephone. An examination of Internet use then requires
an examination of computer, modem, telephone, cable use, and
sometimes, though rarely, satellite and digital broadcast. The
question of access is addressed by NTIA with surveys that, since 1995,
have examined where people log on to the Internet (at home, at
school, at work, at libraries, or at community centers, for example).
NTIA has also surveyed the quality of that access. In other words,
are people using plain old telephone service to access the Internet or
can they take advantage of high capacity transmission services (also
called broadband)?
The new Republican administration at NTIA continued the
"digital divide" reports of the Clinton administration, but altered the
focus to emphasize the growing numbers of Americans with Internet
access rather than the gap between those who had access and those
who did not. The new administration also emphasizes individual use,
rather than household use, in part because "Internet access is more
frequently occurring outside the home, at locations such as work,
schools, and libraries. ' ° The very places the Clinton administration
had been promoting universal service subsidies.., through the "Gore
58. U.S. Dept. of Com., Falling trhough the Net: Defining the Digital Divide,
<http://digitaldivide.gov/reports.htm> (accessed Jan. 21, 2002).
59. U.S. Dept. of Corn., Iroductory Letter by William F. Daley
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn99/daley.html> (accessed Jan. 21, 2002).
60. A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet, 5,
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/html/anationonline2.htm> (NTIA, 2002)..
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Tax" so derided by Republicans.
Where people access cyberspace is important to our examination
of the implications for legal services. Legal matters often require
both privacy, as discussed above, and convenience (physical proximity
and timely availability). Computer access at work may not be useful
if the employee needs to conduct either legal research or seek advice,
particularly considering the fact that 63 percent of companies monitor
employees' computer use61 If schools or libraries are very distant,
closed after normal business hours, or severely limit computer time,
access to legal services at these places may be impossible,62 and when
convenient, communication using school or library (i.e. government)
machines can hardly be considered private. Thus, access to the
Internet at home is very important, so we will define the digital divide
as the gap between those who have access to the Internet at home
and those who do not.
Income, Geography, Race, and the Digital Divide. While there
are extreme examples of the digital divide in states dominated by
Native Americans (New Mexico, for example has an Internet
penetration rate of 35.7 percent), and poor rural populations
(Mississippi has a rate of 26.3 %),63 lack of access to the Internet at
home correlates most strongly with race and income. The share of
households nationwide with "Internet subscriberships" was 50.5% in
September 2001, while "persons using home access" to the Internet
was 43.6%. 6 The home access to the Internet rate in 2000 was 41.5%.
Given the difficulty in comparing what may be apples (home access)
and oranges (Internet subscribership), we will stick with the 2000
figures. The percentage of those with home access to the Internet
dipped slightly in rural areas in 2000 to 38.9%, while 37.7% of central
city households had Internet access.65 (See Figure 1).
61. Neil A. Lewis, supra n. 49.
62. Anick Jesdanun, Internet Access Gap Closing, but Other Inequities Remain (AP
Internet: New York) (March 3, 2002)..
63. The recent report, emphasizing Internet users, rather than household use, reports
that New Mexico with roughly 47 percent Internet users and Mississippi with roughly 39
percent Internet users. See A Nation Online, Table 1-1.
64. See A Nation Online, p. 6.
65. U.S. Dept. of Com., Failling Through the Net,
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn00/falling.htm#1> (Oct. 20, 2000)..
20021
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. r24:505
Figure 1-3 Percent af U.S. Households with Internet Access by U.S., Rural, Urban and Central Cities,
198 and 2000
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According to the NTIA, "households of Asian Americans and
Pacific Islanders have maintained the greatest Internet penetration at
56.8% in 2000." Whites have access to the Internet at home at 46.1%.
However, only 23.6% of Hispanics and 23.5% of blacks use the
Internet at home. (See Figure 2).
Figure I-10 Percent of U.S. Households with Internet Access By Race/Hispanic Origin, 1998 and 2000
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Households with less than $15,000 in income had a 12.7%
Internet penetration rate. At the $15,000 to $24,999 income levels,
21.3% of households had Internet access. The penetration rate for
households with incomes between $25,000 and $34,999 stood at
34.0%. Households with income between $35,000 and $49,999
achieved a 46.1% Internet penetration rate in 2000. Households with
incomes between $50,000 and $74,999 stood at 60.9%, while those
above $75,000 were at 77.7% .66 (See Figure 3).
Figure 1-6 Percent of U.S. Households with Internet Access
by Income ($000s), 1998 and 2000
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That the at-home Internet access penetration rate is one-fourth
for the 32 million U.S. households with incomes under $25,000, as
well as for African Americans and Latinos combined, is a strong
indication of a significant gap in the availability of information
services for those groups when compared to other Americans.
While there has been substantial growth across regions, income,
and race, there remain significant gaps regarding access to the
Internet at home. This paper is not going to devote room to the
debates over whether the glass is half-empty, or why poor people
66. Id. at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn00/Faling.htm#20>
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choose not to access the Internet in comparable numbers to wealthier
Americans. As the recent NTIA report puts it: "Individuals living in
low-income households or having little education, still trail the
national average."67 This is sufficient to note the fact of the digital
divide. That the divide is real should come as no real surprise. Even
in times of prosperity, as imagined prior to 2001, there remained
tremendous divides in the United States along the lines of wealth and
race,68 reflected in a divide in access to quality education and health
care.69 And, perhaps most important, there is a divide in political
influence. Of course there is a divide regarding access to new
communications technologies. Since this divide exists, there will be
limits as to what new communications technologies can do to help
establish equal access to justice. However, there may be, within those
limits, important opportunities.
C. The Opportunities Offered by Technology
The ABA sets out eleven agenda items to improve access to
justice, one of which directly focuses on tasks new networked
communications technologies might assist in accomplishing:
informing people about their legal options, and helping them with
legal referrals. Another agenda item touches on another goal with
which the Internet might help: making the courts "more
approachable" by using more simplified forms and procedures. 70
In the fall of 1998, the Legal Services Corporation, the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association, the Center for Law and Social
Policy, the Project for the Future of Equal Justice, and the National
Center for State Courts sponsored a conference on Technology and
the Future of Legal Services.71 As a result of that work, Technology
67. A Nation Online, p. 10.
68. Stephen J. Rose, Social Stratification in the United States (New York: The New
Press, 2000).
69. See especially Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools
(New York, Crown: 1991); see also Peter T. Kilborn, Denver's Hispanic Residents Point to
Ills of the Uninsured, N.Y. Times (April 9, 1999); and Jo Becker, Racial Gap Found in
Health Care, Montgomery Study Shows Black Children Face Tougher Odds, Washington
Post*March 14, 2001).
70. Agenda for Access.
71. In a good, if overheated, report based on that meeting John Tull describes the
possible benefits of communications technologies in advancing access to justice.While Tull
dwells on none of the cautions mentioned above (information collection, privacy,
authentication, the digital divide), if one is careful enough to read the cold water of the
footnotes the problems are apparent enough. The second footnote reads: "at present the
heralded web is painfully slow and cluttered with junk. Software is often idiosyncratic and
fitful; access, while widespread, is very far from universal; and technology often produces
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Initiative Grants from the LSC, and the profit-seeking work of
corporations such as Lexis/Nexis and Westlaw, some consider the
public interest legal community to be far ahead of most of the non-
profit world in the use of the Internet and other communications
technologies."
Educating citizens about legal rights and assistance. The fact that
responsible legal service providers can provide free and accurate
information about legal rights (albeit in competition with frauds and
pranksters) is a genuine improvement over an environment where
there is no readily available source of easily understood legal
information. Information technology can provide valuable
services.., potentially. There is even a likelihood that web searches
will become more reliable, and more sophisticated in the ability to
understand what a client needs through better prompting protocols,
some perhaps with voice recognition capabilities.
Understanding one's rights, and understanding the role lawyers
and courts can play in protecting those rights, is a necessary first step
in access to justice. In an important sense, making information
available (about the reach or limitation of a product warranty, or a
lease, for example) may help to prevent the need of court action by
suggesting to unscrupulous sellers or landlords that the buyer or
lessee is most likely informed, thus raising the perceived costs of
improper action. Making this correct legal information available may
also help a potential client avoid signing a lease or buying a lemon.
Legal referral services are also extraordinarily helpful in
addressing one of the biggest difficulties people have in access to
justice. Finding an appropriate attorney to provide basic counsel is
not easy. Often the most useful and comfortable referral services are
telephone answering services supported by accurate databases.
Providing information to support pro se representation. When
armed with accurate legal information, it is possible to defy the adage
that a man who would represent himself at court has a fool for a
client. But, of course, adequate information is much more than basic
information about rights and the role of lawyers, it must also include
information about how to operate within the court's procedures, such
far less than its enthusiasts promise." Footnote 7 reads: "[one] task for legal services
programs may be to monitor [legal] information on the web to check it for accuracy and
possible exploitive content." John Tull, Technology and the Future of Legal Services,
Equal Justice Network, <http://www.equaljustice.org/visions/
TechConf/johntull-techpaper.pdf>.
72. Hugh Calkins, Project for the Future of Equal Justice, Are We Ready for the
Technology Revolution?, <http://www.nlada.org/corner/f2000/calkins.htm> (2000)..
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as how to obtain information from the clerk of the court and how to
file papers. In addition, the basic forms and customs (such as the
stilted and archaic language) of most courts and court proceedings
can be easily provided in pre-produced forms, and can be filled out by
a computer in communication with a pro se litigant, much the way
"TurboTax" helps to prepare state and federal tax forms.
Many courts already make available basic information (such as
court hours and contact information for the clerk of the court), case
information (including case numbers and documents filed), as well as
docket and calendar information. This information is made available
at public terminals at the court, at kiosks in public places such as
libraries, and even via web or direct dial up services. It is even
possible to pay court fees and to file via computer interfaces.
Increasing capabilities of legal service organizations. Information
technologies have already generated much improved systems for
better case management. A lawyer, or team of lawyers, handling
multiple cases at any one time, typical of public service practice, can
create, file, and retrieve a wide range of legal documents without
access to a team of legal secretaries to keep everything in order. The
ability to access documents, even while in court, at the touch of a few
keystrokes, should make already overextended public service lawyers
more efficient. In addition, electronic filing can save substantial
amounts of time and money on clerks, assistants, and copying.
The lawyer is in a much better position to weed out bad
information from the Internet, so the dangers of relying upon
Internet searches are far less for her than her client. This resource
makes not only up-to-date case law and regulations available,
replacing expensive and easily dated books, but scientific research
and other "evidence" can also be more easily accessible to even the
sole practitioner.
New communications technologies can improve access to legal
services, but to suggest that because the technology is possible it will
benefit most Americans is to indulge in the sort of fantasy more
appropriate to futurists like Toffler. Widely accessible and intelligent
use of technology is no more inevitable than widely accessible and
intelligent application of our laws. As Benjamin Barber writes:
Where technology takes our political and social institutions will
depend, in part, on where we take technology. Science and its
products remain tools, and although the parable of the tools that
come to enslave the tool-makers is an ancient one, it is not
necessarily the only description of the modern technological
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dilemma. Rather, we must see technological determinism as one
among a number of possible scenarios that depend at least in part
on the choices we make about technology's use.
So again, we return full force to the field of politics, and law
which results from politics. Below we briefly consider one reason we
fall short of our goal of equal access to justice, and advance a
proposal for reform.
IV. Playing Politics
The courts of justice are the visible organs by which the legal
profession is enabled to control the democracy.... It must not be
supposed, moreover, that the legal spirit is confined in the United
States to the courts of justice; it extends far beyond them. As the
lawyers form the only enlightened class whom the people do not
mistrust, they are naturally called upon to occupy most of the
public stations. They fill the legislative assemblies and are at the
head of the administration; they consequently exercise a powerful
influence upon the formation of the law and upon its execution.
The lawyers are obliged, however, to yield to the current of public
opinion, which is too strong for them to resist, but it is easy to find
indications of what they would do if they were free to act.
-Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1833
A. The System of Justice as Political Result
Our laws and courts, and the lawyers and judges who animate
them, are neither market nor machine. Equal justice is at its core a
social value, the tools of economists reach toward equilibrium and
efficiencies, which cannot be intelligently confused with normative
goals of equality and political efficacy. The tricks of the economist's
sad trade are useful, but there must be a special place in hell for
anyone who would make them determinative of the treatment of men
who regularly fail most measurements of rational behavior. Markets
(with their past and present tolerance of slavery, child labor and
worker exploitation) are brutal enough without placing the courts
under the jurisdiction of their "invisible hand."
Nor is justice a machine that can be fundamentally improved
upon by the addition of new gadgets, in the way computers can
73. Benjamin R. Barber, A Passion for Democracy (Princeton, Princeton, 1998) at
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improve the performance of car engines. And while communications
technologies can assist in a variety of ways to extend information
about, and access to, the courts, they introduce additional problems
and do not erase the disadvantages of moderate income and poor
Americans at court. It is not difficult to see that access to new
communications technologies may exacerbate the "justice divide" by
increasing the ability of wealthier corporations or the government to
be more effective litigants. The concern to increase access to
communications technologies among the poor is, perhaps, less about
achieving equal justice, and more about stalling the increasing
inequality of justice which results from inequalities in wealth and the
tools "monied might" is able to afford.
Unfortunately, as Eisenstein writes, "if we examine the patterns
of who gets what as a result of the operation of the legal process, the
inescapable conclusion is that these outcomes reflect the same values
and balance of interests that characterize other components of the
political system."7 Whatever we might think of the fact that our
elected representatives cut funding to legal services and limited the
work those services can perform, whatever we might think of what
the post-Warren Courts have left of Gideon and Miranda, we must
admit these are political acts. We, that is, our representatives or the
judges our representatives appointed, acted to extend and to limit
access to justice. There is nothing surprising about this, laws are,
after all, determined through the political process; it is that process
which gives law its legitimacy. The political process is what the
phrase "government of the people, by the people and for the people"
means. But to simply end the analysis with the observation that
unequal access to justice is the result of politics as usual would be too
easy. Leaving it here might suggest that, at best, the simple inertia of
the political bureaucracy or the incremental nature of legislation is
the problem, and that either patience is the solution or there is no
solution.
Perhaps unintentionally, Lawrence Lessig suggests a clue when
he writes that, with the exception of the Warren Court, courts tend to
act as translators of past constitutional doctrine but keep in mind
present public opinion. "Courts are subject to the constraints of what
'everyone' believes is right, even if what 'everyone' believes is
inconsistent with basic constitutional texts."75  Thus, African
Americans were denied the right to vote in some states up until the
74. Eisenstein, supra n. 38, at 338.
75. Lessig, supra n. 47, at 214.
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1960's, and Asian Americans could be taken from their homes and
placed behind barbed wire during World War II, and laws punishing
political speech could be upheld during the McCarthy era. The view
that courts are actors in a political system is a little more complex
(and, perhaps, more sympathetic) view than the suggestion that court
decisions are the result of politics as usual.
The challenge then is to generate a discourse which compels the
court to see unequal access to justice as a constitutional problem, and
then to compel legislators to spend resources which further the goal
of equal access to justice. Getting legislators to use tax dollars to pay
for lawyers to create more work for the court may seem like a pipe
dream. 6 However, lawyers at the bar and the bench, with potentially
enormous political resources, should see it in their interest to use
what leverage they have to encourage legislators to advance this
particular constitutional goal. There are a few signs that some in the
legal community understand that to achieve equal justice they must
engage in political action. For example, in early 2001, a New York
trial court judge denied that State's motion to dismiss a lawsuit
brought by the New York County Lawyers' Association (NYCLA),
represented by pro bono lawyers from the large New York firm,
Davis, Polk & Wardell." NYCLA is arguing that fees currently paid
to court-appointed counsel are constitutionally inadequate.
According to Marvin Schechter, co-chair of the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers' Indigent Defense Committee:
The Governor's and the legislature's unwillingness, year after year,
to provide adequate funding for defenders of the poor has resulted
in a crisis, evidenced in recent weeks by the inability of judges to
find enough lawyers who are willing to take court-appointed cases.
Those most harmed by the current system - children and poor
adults - may not be able to raise objections to systemic
inadequacies, and thus courts must recognize the crucial role of
professional legal panels like NYCLA and NACDL stepping in to
protect the rights of poor individuals.7"
76. Cole, supra n. 33, at 92.
77. NYCLA v. The State of New York, Index No. 102987/00
<http://www.nycla.org/publications/nycla71.pdf> (accessed Jan. 22, 2003)..
78. Press Release of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, New
York lawyers' group has standing to challenge assigned counsel rates
<http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/newsreleases/2001mn008?opendocument> (accessed Jan.
19, 2001)..
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The heart of the dispute brought by NYCLA is not really about
the rights of the poor, but the fees paid to attorneys who represent
the poor. One gets round to the rights of the poor by the logic that if
the state increases pay to attorneys to represent the poor, there will
be a corresponding increase in both the numbers of lawyers and the
competency of legal service for the poor. But Schechter's core point
is worth focusing on: that those most disadvantaged by inequality are
not in a position to bring about needed change.
And here we come to the most important role new
communications technologies can play in helping those concerned
about equal justice to establish a closer rendering of its promise to the
American public. The bar must see and utilize the true primary value
of new communications technologies - to increase our capability for
political communication. New communications technologies put
lawyers in a position to begin a powerful debate about justice in
America.
B. Delivering the Message
The true strength of communications technologies is the
increased capability of organized groups to engage in public
discourse. I am using discourse to mean not only delivering messages
to mass audiences, but organizing, educating, communicating directly
to large and small audiences around rather than through the
traditional gatekeepers - global communications industries.
Internet as organizing tool. The American Bar Association, the
American Trial Lawyers Association, and all the state bars have a
tremendous ability to organize national recruitment efforts to
generate petitions and conduct local seminars and issue statements to
news organizations. The Internet is a perfect tool to generate and
coordinate this activity. Through the Internet editorials can be
distributed, information about the legal needs of citizens specific to
the jurisdiction can be provided, and comparisons between
jurisdictions can be demonstrated graphically. Information on why a
campaign is needed, how to sign up, or how to donate can all be done
via the Internet. The Internet can be the backbone of an interactive
intense national campaign. As the 2000 presidential campaign
demonstrated, the Internet can even help to raise money to spend it
where the average American' is most likely to get the message: radio
and especially television.
Advertising as public education. Imagine a Harry and Louise
commercial aimed not at defeating health care legislation, but at
spurring legislation to support universal access to justice. As the
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politicians know, if you want to reach the American public, buy
television time. Well crafted messages, dramatic stories about the
unmet legal needs of Americans should be created, tested, and aired
in markets where state and national legislators do business. This is
how political communication is conducted in America today. Spots
on radio and television, combined with web-based interactivity and e-
mail campaigns, are a sign of political sophistication, but they are not
enough.
Getting attention and creating social pressure for reform.
Members of the bar include corporate executives, an ex-president,
judges, present and former legislators, and others who can capture the
attention of not only the public but of state and local legislators.
Lawyers can also raise money and donate to political PACs and
candidates.
Modern communications technologies can play a more powerful
role than ever before in bringing together the various interests,
explaining the cause to the public, and persuading legislators to
appropriate the necessary resources. A debate about equal access to
justice should be vigorously pursued using advanced communications
technologies.
V. Conclusion - Why It Must Be Done
If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment:
Thou shall not ration justice.
-Learned Hand7 9
It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial
system that is the true backbone of the rule of law. Time will one
day heal the wound to that confidence that will be inflicted by
today's decision. One thing, however, is certain. Although we may
never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of
this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly
clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial
guardian of the rule of law.
-John Paul Stevens, Bush v. Gore, 531 U. S. 98, 128-29 (2000).
It is difficult to remember a time when the nation's highest
legal officials have been so widely, and so fiercely criticized. When
this is viewed along with the catalogue of ills already mentioned, it is
apparent that the perception of justice in America is in crisis. This
79. Fred R. Shapiro, ed. Oxford Dictionary of American Legal Quotations (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), at 232.
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condition will not be altered by the manipulation of even a properly
understood U.S. market. And even if you solve the considerable
problems inherent in the introduction of new communications
technologies, computers and the Internet will not reduce the justice
divide in America. But, a nation, a society founded on law and
operating through law, cannot put its head in the sand when our
ideals of justice fall short. If we cannot fix our administration of
justice, we will not only lose confidence in our selection of presidents,
we will lose confidence "in markets, and the introduction of new
technologies, and all else.
American society is extraordinarily tolerant of political failure,
perhaps too tolerant. To some extent this tolerance is the residual
glow of the near religious nature of the respect Americans still have
in their courts. As more citizens brush up against not only the
televised failures, but face their own problems with courts and
lawyers, this glow will dim. Those who will suffer most directly from
the failure of our third branch are those least able to correct it; their
answer is clear from the ABA survey. Too many simply do what they
can to avoid contact with lawyers and the courts to their detriment.
Others will take more destructive paths.
If exit is not an option for most Americans, voice is the
appropriate response to state failure. Political scientist Robert Dahl
argues that the usual failure of most citizens to use their political
voice (contacting their representatives, organizing petitions,
participating in political rallies, etc.) results in an unusual amount of
force when they do speak, as seen in the protest against the military
action in Vietnam." But as the responsibility for war policy was fairly
clear, who will be the target of protest against the collapse of justice?
Certainly not the legislators, or the executive. And what is the
expression of political voice as directed against the courts? Perhaps
demands for less support, except for police and jails - the worst
possible result.
Social psychologists Caryl Rusbault and Dan Farrell suggest that
if neither voice nor exit proves an effective option, there remains
neglect. Neglect can be passive, sometimes mistaken for apathy or
indifference, and can be destructive. Think of hackers. African-
Americans have long employed this sort of reaction to political
situations where they could neither exit nor express their voice." But
80. Mayer N. Zald, Lecutre, Taking it to the Streets in the Office: Collective Actions
and Protest in Organizations, U. of Mich., Literature, Sci. & the Arts Distinguished Senior
Faculty Lecture (Ann Arbor, Mich., Fall 2000)..
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it does not require a scientist to understand that any authority that
does not adhere to the standards by which it claims legitimacy risks
dissent. Once law begins to lose its legitimacy, civil society loses its
foundation.
New communications technologies can help correct this, if they
are properly used to focus and direct political dialogue. The justice
divide, just like the digital divide, can be closed, but first we must
understand that the divide is neither caused by, nor can it be
corrected by, the market or the machine. We must understand that
the digital divide, like the justice divide, is a political divide.
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